



**Racism in a Racialized Democracy and
Support for Affirmative Action Policy
in Salvador and São Paulo, Brazil**

Gladys Mitchell-Walthour

University affirmative-action policies in Brazil have come under attack from a number of scholars who believe the program is inappropriate for Brazil's multiracial population. Peter Fry et al.'s *Dangerous Divisions: Racial Politics in Contemporary Brazil* (2007) includes a number of opinion pieces by both scholars and activists against university affirmative action. On the other hand, sociologists such as Antonio Guimarães (2001) and Sales Augusto dos Santos (2006) support the programs. North American scholar Seth Racusen (2010) proposes a novel approach with a schema that would consider both class and race in university affirmative action. Much of the debate focuses on Brazilian racial identity and why the policy is inappropriate. There is also a focus on class, and the fact that Brazil's primary and secondary public schools are inadequate, and most of those attending these schools are Afro-Brazilian. For this reason, opponents of affirmative action believe resources should be allocated to improving public schools rather than supporting university affirmative action.

What is lost in most scholarship concerned with affirmative action is an examination of political opinions of those who would potentially benefit from such policies. This chapter examines determinants of Afro-Brazilian support of affirmative action. I focus on respondents in Salvador and São Paulo. My hypothesis is that Afro-Brazilians who believe blacks (*negros*) face difficulties in society due to racism and discrimination claim a black identification, and the highly educated are more likely to support affirmative-action policy than those who do not acknowledge racism as a

major problem for blacks, who claim nonblack identifications, and are less educated. Previous research has shown that Afro-Brazilians who claim a black identification are more likely to vote for black candidates (G. Mitchell 2010a), and that those who identify as a black racial group tend to vote for black candidates (G. Mitchell 2009). Because Black Movement activists tend to be middle-class (Hanchard 1994; Burdick 1998), I believe those with higher education will support the policy more than those with lower education. The alternative hypothesis is that Afro-Brazilians with higher levels of education are more likely not to support affirmative-action policies than those with lower levels of education. Perhaps people with higher education believe they were successful based on merit, and that merit only should be considered for university admission rather than one's racial background. In fact, Stanley R. Bailey and Edward E. Telles (2006) find that among *negros* (*pretos* and *pardos*) and *brancos* there is less support for quotas in employment and in universities as education increases. Those with higher education are less likely to support affirmative action than those with lower education. Bailey and Telles use large-scale survey data collected in 2000 in the state of Rio de Janeiro.

Gislene Aparecida dos Santos's (2008) interviews reveal that Afro-Brazilian high school students are less supportive of affirmative-action programs for Afro-Brazilians, and most prefer that the policy be class-based. However, she also finds that Afro-Brazilian university students, through outreach, encourage Afro-Brazilian high school students to consider university admission under affirmative-action programs because it is a right granted to them as citizens. These students oftentimes begin to claim a black identification after attending university. Andrew Francis and Turrini-Pinto (2009) find that at the University of Brasilia, candidates for admission misrepresent their color to be considered for university affirmative action. However, using a survey, Bailey (2008) finds that nearly half of racially mixed Brazilians would choose white over black racial classifications if forced to choose one. He also finds that using photographs where respondents can determine if an individual is eligible for quotas for blacks (*negros*), most respondents do not believe those of lighter and medium skin tones deserve inclusion in the quotas. In fact, for the photographs of individuals with medium skin tone, 60 percent of mulattos do not find them deserving of quota inclusion. Nonetheless, Bailey also finds that in an experiment, simply mentioning a racial policy for *negros* increases the percentage of those identifying as such. These findings appear counterintuitive, but I believe that as in the University of Brasília case, when faced with the real-life choice of benefiting from affirmative action, some candidates for university admission will in fact change or misrepresent their identification to benefit from the program. I do not intend to contribute to the literature on changing racial identification to benefit from affirmative action. Rather,

I am interested in the determinants of support for affirmative action among Afro-Brazilians, and hope to contribute to social-science literature on political opinion and behavior of Afro-Brazilians.

This chapter focuses on Afro-Brazilians in Salvador and São Paulo, Brazil, exclusively. I examine whether support of affirmative-action policy is related to sociodemographic factors such as Afro-Brazilians' educational level, age, gender, income, color identification, and opinions about the major problems blacks (*negros*) face in Brazil. Presumably, respondents attributing blacks' problems to racism and discrimination might support racial policies aimed at reducing discrimination. Juliet Hooker, in *Race and the Politics of Solidarity* (2009), notes that political solidarity is racialized and shaped by race despite the fact that scholars of multicultural theories often do not discuss racialized solidarity. In the case of the United States, there are huge disparities between whites' and blacks' political opinions regarding racial injustice and racial inequality, Hooker posits that there are also differences in support for racial policies because of differential sympathy. She states, "As a result of racialization, the pain and suffering of nonwhites are either rendered invisible or, when visible, are seen as less deserving of empathy and redress than those of whites (2009, 40). While Hooker's work is largely theoretical and focuses on Afro-descended and indigenous communities in Nicaragua, her point regarding empathy and solidarity is well taken. This chapter only focuses on Afro-descendants and does not presume solidarity. On the contrary, I assume differences exist among Afro-Brazilians in terms of racial identification and political opinion. Examining responses about the major problem of blacks allows me to analyze differential sympathy, especially when noted by acknowledging difficulties blacks face because of race rather than simply class. More importantly, I will examine how a respondent's opinion about the major problem of blacks and sociodemographic factors impact their support for affirmative action. Throughout this chapter Afro-Brazilians are synonymous with Afro-descendants. All survey respondents identify as Afro-descendants, although they self-identify as belonging to various color or racial categories.

RACE, RACISM, AND RACIAL POLITICS IN BRAZIL

In the past, Brazilians viewed their country as distinct from the United States because of conceptions of race and racism. American racism is viewed as explicit, whereas Brazilian racism and discrimination are characterized as hidden and less clear because of class inequality and a racially mixed population. Social relations in Brazil

appear to be fairly integrated and racially harmonious among racial groups (Telles 2004). Edward Telles (2004) notes in his explanation of vertical and horizontal relations that there are huge gaps in educational attainment, income, and mortality rates between white Brazilians and nonwhite Brazilians; yet social relations appear to be racially integrated or less rigid in terms of intermarriage and residential segregation than in the United States and South Africa. Brazilian racism has been documented by various scholars, such as Florestan Fernandes's (1965) UNESCO-sponsored research documenting racial inequality in the 1950s; Carlos Hasenbalg's (1978) research showing differences in social mobility by race in the late 1970s; France Winddance Twine's (1998) anthropological research on racism in the 1990s; and Michael Mitchell and Charles Wood's (1998) work on police abuse of browns and blacks. Such research, along with Black Movement activists who have long acknowledged racism in Brazilian society, proves that Brazil has not been immune to racism in its society.

Traditionally, white Brazilian political elites promoted the idea that Brazil was a racial democracy where racism did not exist, because of its mixed-race citizenry; however, today the idea of racial democracy is often referred to as a myth among scholars and activists. Brazilian racial politics have changed dramatically. Affirmative-action policies in universities were first implemented in 2001. Federal Law 10.639/03, passed in 2003, requires public schools to teach African and Afro-Brazilian history. Black Movement activists supported and pushed for such policies, while at the same time encouraging Afro-Brazilians to embrace blackness. In addition, Black Movement activism has expanded the traditional boundaries of volunteer organizations and are now formal nongovernmental and nonprofit organizations (S. Santos 2010), nontraditional routes of activism are present in hip-hop organizations and activity (Reiter and Mitchell 2010; S. Santos 2010; Pardue 2004), "prevestibular" courses also serve as avenues for disseminating racial consciousness (S. Santos 2010), and political campaigns serve as a means of mobilization and teaching racial consciousness (G. Mitchell 2009). Given that much of the work of Black Movement activism continues to push for affirmative-action policies and encourage Afro-Brazilians to embrace blackness and contemporary activism, and is disseminated in these nontraditional ways, one must ask, how do Afro-Brazilians perceive such programs? Do they embrace a black identification, and does this impact their support for affirmative action? Does acknowledging racism as a problem blacks face, as opposed to simply a class problem, result in differential support for affirmative-action policies? This chapter seeks to answer these questions. Before my analysis, I briefly review the literature on Brazilian racial politics. Second, I define key terms such as racism, and racial and color identification. Lastly, I follow with analyses of my quantitative study.

CURRENT LITERATURE

The goal of this chapter is not to outline the specifics of affirmative-action policies throughout Brazil, nor do I seek to give a thorough review of scholarship on affirmative action. Rather, I situate my work in research on Brazilian politics and political behavior, and research on racial attitudes and racial politics. On the one hand, scholars do not consider race as significant to Brazilian politics (von Metteinheim 1986; Hagopian 1996; Mainwaring et al. 2000). On the other hand, racial politics and the role of race in Brazilian politics have been studied since the 1970s (de Souza 1971; M. Mitchell 1977, 2007; Pereira 1982; Soares and Silva 1987; Valente 1986; C astro 1993; Hanchard 1994; Prandi 1996; Oliviera 1997, 2007; Johnson 1998, 2006; Nobles 2000; S. Santos 2000; Guimar aes 2001; Telles 2004; Bailey 2009). My research contributes to this body of work with the hope of broadening knowledge on political opinion, racial identification, and racial attitudes of Afro-Brazilians.

Ethnographic and sociological scholarship differs in findings concerning black group identity. Robin Sheriff (2001), in her ethnographic work in a slum community in Rio de Janeiro, finds that Afro-Brazilians essentially have a bipolar view of race as white and black, but use various color gradations to soften the effect of color. In an effort to be polite, color gradations are used to describe a person, rather than the term "black." Stanley Bailey (2009) claims that racial group identity does not exist among Afro-Brazilians. Citing the 2002 PESP survey in which only 7 percent of respondents chose to self-classify as *negro*, Bailey concludes that "Brazil clearly lacks the sense of black racial group membership and many of the types of participation in antiracism found in the U.S. context (2009, 121)." Drawing from a 2000 racial-attitudes study conducted in the state of Rio de Janeiro, Bailey finds little difference in color categories between whites and Afro-Brazilians who agree that the *negro* movement is right, and that prejudice must be the object of a struggle to overcome it (126). He finds that *pretos* are most willing to participate in antiracism activities (127), and that *morenos* and whites differ significantly from browns, *pretos*, *negros*, and all others in the choice of "a lot" over "no" in willingness to become a member of an antiracism organization (131). Bailey notes this difference, and posits that differences between *moreno* attitudes and other Afro-Brazilian attitudes toward the *negro* movement may serve as a barrier for mobilization. Because the focus of these findings is to show that white and "nonwhite" Brazilian racial attitudes are not distinctly different, in contrast to clear differences between whites and blacks in the United States, there is no exclusive focus on Afro-Brazilians. I hope to contribute to the growing body of work on racial attitudes by exclusively focusing on Afro-Brazilians and trends within cities, using

city surveys rather than state and national surveys. These trends may not be revealed in state and national surveys.

KEY TERMS

“Color” and “racial identification” refer to the color or racial group a respondent self-identifies as. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) note the processual nature of identification, making this term preferable to identity. In this article, *preto* and *negro* are considered separate categories. *Preto* is considered a color category, while *negro* is considered a politically charged racial category. Because *negro* was and continues to be promoted by the Black Movement, it is politically charged. Mainstream media use the term *negro* as the sum of *pardos* and *pretos*; however, I consider it a racialized identification because of its historical usage.

As Melissa Nobles (2000) demonstrates, during specific time periods political elites, academics, and census officials were motivated to use the census to further their political agendas, and at other times they were not. The addition of more mixed-race categories helped political elites empirically show that Brazil was becoming less black and more white. This was important as Brazil searched for a national identity in the early twentieth century. In contrast, political activists involved in the Black Movement pushed for a change of the color categories for the 2000 census. They were concerned with the use of the term *pardo*. They preferred that *moreno* be used in place of *pardo*. *Moreno* is used more in social settings than *pardo*, so members of the Black Movement believed more people would choose this term. The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) did not replace *pardo* with *moreno*. In the most recent (2000) census, categories include white, black (*preto*), brown (*pardo*), yellow, and indigenous. In sum, it is important to note that categorization depends on political agendas and *who* categorizes. At different historical periods, white political elites categorized and constructed race to further their political and social agendas (Nobles 2000). On the other hand, Afro-Brazilian activists also had political agendas and wanted to identify people of African descent in ways that were politically beneficial to their agenda. My study relies on self-identification in an open-ended question that can be especially revealing considering the Black Movement’s goals.

Racism and *racial discrimination* throughout the article are synonymous terms. Racism is negative differential treatment or perceptions of people based on one’s perceived color or racial categorization of that individual. Telles (2004) documents racial inequality in occupational mobility, income, and educational attainment due

to racial discrimination. He also discusses how discrimination operates as negative stereotypes in the Brazilian context. Negative stereotypes of blacks are often disseminated as humor through jokes in daily life (154), and in the media, blacks and browns are virtually nonexistent. When they do appear, they are portrayed with certain behaviors while whites are seen as beautiful, happy, and middle-class (155). In schools, teachers give more preference to lighter children and invest more in them (158).

Statistical comparisons of infant mortality show that in 2005, infant mortality was higher for blacks and browns than whites: 24.4 percent for *pretos* and *pardas*, and 23.7 percent for *brancas* (Paixão and Carvano 2008, 38). In 2006 the number of whites attending university was over four times the number of blacks and browns attending university (81). Despite inequalities in health and education, some argue that these are class inequalities. This is often the argument made in debates about university affirmative action. Those against affirmative action believe that public school education should be improved because poorer children attend such schools. Yet, Paixão and Carvano (2008) show that *pretos* and *pardos* who have finished college are 1.2 times more likely to be unemployed compared to whites with the same schooling. This difference can be attributed to racial discrimination.

Racism is explicitly practiced as police brutality—a problem Afro-Brazilians face. Michael Mitchell and Charles H. Wood (1998) find that the likelihood of assault by police officers on men increases depending on skin color and age. Younger black and brown men are more likely to be assaulted by the police than whites. Although income and education decrease one's chance of assault, it is important to note color differences. The darker one's skin color, the higher likelihood of assault by police officers. In my study, I am concerned with whether or not respondents cite discrimination as a hindrance in blacks' lives rather than simply acknowledging class barriers.

METHODOLOGY

I rely on an original survey carried out in Salvador and São Paulo, Brazil, in 2006. The survey has 674 respondents. Salvador is located in the northeast, a poor region, and is known as the “mecca” of Afro-Brazilian culture. It is nearly 70 percent African-descendant. São Paulo is in the south, a wealthier region of Brazil. Its population is nearly 30 percent African-descendant. According to the 2000 census, 20 percent of Salvador's population considered themselves *preto*. In São Paulo, 5 percent considered themselves *preto*. Black Movement activity has occurred in São Paulo since the 1930s (Hanchard 1994; Covin 2006), making it an interesting site of comparison.

São Paulo is also home to the first university specifically for African descendants in Latin America.

In consultation with experts in survey methods from the Federal University of Bahia (UFBA), I chose the Salvador neighborhoods Federação, Peri peri, and Itapoã. Federação is socioeconomically heterogeneous.¹ Part of the campus of UFBA, a prestigious public university, is located in Federação, which includes middle-class households. There are also very low-income households. Itapoã is also socioeconomically diverse, but has a large proportion of low-income households. Peri peri is located in the suburbs. It is a low-income neighborhood. It is relatively easy to find African descendants in these neighborhoods. A total of 346 interviews were conducted in Salvador. Brazilian undergraduate students conducted interviews. They were trained in interviewing methods. Interviewers in São Paulo were affiliated with a student group that focuses on racial issues. All interviewers in São Paulo self-identify as *negro/a*. In Salvador, one interviewer self-identifies as white, one as *parda*, and the others identify as *negra*. Interviewers told potential interviewees that the study was with Afro-descendants and asked if any lived in the household. The respondent ultimately determined their selection to participate in the study. The survey does not include respondents who are self-identified whites *and* who were identified as white by interviewers. Thus when reporting results, white Afro-descendants are those who self-identified as white but were not identified as such by interviewers. Unlike large-scale Brazilian national surveys that include whites, *pretos*, and *pardos*, this survey is restricted to Afro-descendants in select neighborhoods.

In São Paulo, along with experts of research on race in Brazil, I identified neighborhoods with high populations of Afro-descendants, but that were also socioeconomically diverse. Neighborhoods chosen were Cidade Tiradentes, Casa Verde, Brasilândia, Campo Limpo, and Capão Redondo. Cidade Tiradentes is a low-income neighborhood located in the far east of São Paulo. Casa Verde is mostly middle-class in the northeast of São Paulo. Campo Limpo is located in the southwest and is known for its large social divisions. Capão Redondo is located on the periphery in the south. I obtained neighborhood maps from the Institute of Brazilian Geography and Statistics (IBGE) in São Paulo, and randomization was introduced by randomly selecting streets where students conducted face-to-face interviews, and through interviewer selection. A total of 328 interviews were conducted.

Students were assigned to at least two neighborhoods. Randomization was also introduced as interviewers used a skip-number method and conducted interviews at every fifth house, or third house if the street did not contain many houses. Respondents were of voting age. Voting is mandatory for those who are 18 to 70 years old. However,

citizens can begin voting at the age of 16. A total of 674 interviews were conducted in Salvador and São Paulo.

SELECTION BIAS

Since 2007, blacks and browns have outnumbered whites, and this was due to an increase in Afro-Brazilians identifying as black (*preto*). Nonetheless, nationally most Afro-Brazilians identify as brown (*pardo*). In the 2000 census, 45 percent of the population identified as white, 39 percent as brown, 6 percent as black, and less than 1 percent as yellow or indigenous. In Salvador, in the census, 66 percent of the population consider themselves black or brown. In São Paulo, 30 percent of the population consider themselves black (*preto*) and brown (*pardo*). In both cities, most Afro-Brazilians consider themselves brown. It is impossible to know how many Afro-Brazilians self-identify as white. My Salvador and São Paulo samples are biased because of the large number of respondents identifying as black (*preto* or *negro*).

These biases are accounted for because my sample includes a significant percentage of young people. Livio Sansone (2004) finds that younger people self-identify more as black. Stanley R. Bailey and Edward E. Telles (2006) find that younger and educated people are more likely to choose the *negro* category than older people. People with higher education are more likely to choose the *negro* category rather than the *moreno* category (Bailey and Telles 2006). They claim that for younger people, *negro* is associated with a modern identity that is influenced by black American culture dispersed by music. They also concur that educated Afro-Brazilians claiming the *negro* identity are more exposed to black activists' rhetoric than those who are less educated. This rhetoric encourages a collective black identity. Although my sample is biased, the study is especially useful as respondents were able to freely choose a color or racial identification without being restricted to census categories. This survey is not generalizable to the country of Brazil, because it is restricted to neighborhoods in the cities of Salvador and São Paulo. The survey is intended to add to existing literature restricted to other states or local communities.

Telles (2004) finds that the black and brown isolation index from whites in neighborhoods in Salvador is 82, which is close to Chicago's index of 83—Chicago being the most segregated city in the United States. An index of 100 indicates full isolation from whites. However, in the Salvador case, this is due to the large population of blacks rather than housing discrimination as present in the United States. This result

is telling because it highlights the fact that neighborhoods in my Salvador sample are quite representative of Afro-descendant neighborhoods, considering that most black and brown neighborhoods are isolated from white neighborhoods. The segregation index for São Paulo is only 37, and the population percentage of blacks and browns is 25 percent (Telles 2004, 203). However, it must be again noted that isolation indexes are affected by the population percentage. Telles also shows that, with the exception of five districts, the districts in the center of São Paulo city are mostly white, and almost all of them are less than 16 percent black and brown (199). Larger percentages of blacks and browns are found in districts in the periphery, where most of my survey interviews were conducted, making the survey useful in highlighting racial-opinion dynamics in such neighborhoods.

DESCRIPTIVE RESULTS OF THE 2006 SURVEY

Color and Race

Negro is a racial category. *Preto* is a color category denoting black, and *pardo* denotes brown or mixed-race people. *Moreno* is a term that Brazilians of all colors may identify as, and includes dark-skinned and light-skinned people with tans. Respondents were asked to identify their color in an open-ended and closed-ended question. In the open-ended question, they could identify in a color category with no choices given. In the closed-ended question, they were asked to choose a census color category. The census categories in the 2000 census were white (*branco*), brown (*pardo*), black (*preto*), yellow (*amarelo*), and indigenous (*indígena*). Yellow denotes people of Asian descent. Considering the open-ended color categories in both cities, 2 percent of Afro-Brazilians identified as white, 62 percent as black (*preto, negro, negão*), and 36 percent as brown (*mulato, moreno, pardo, moreno claro, marrom*). In my surveys, in both cities, more Afro-Brazilians chose a “brown” color or racial category in the open-ended question than interviewers classified them as (see table 1). In Salvador, interviewers classified 102 respondents as brown (*pardo*), whereas 121 respondents identified themselves as brown (*mulato, moreno, pardo, moreno claro, marrom*). In São Paulo, interviewers classified 119 respondents as brown and 143 respondents identified themselves as brown (*mulato, moreno, pardo, moreno claro, moreno escuro, moreno jambo, marrom*). There is a tendency to identify as brown because it acknowledges racial mixture, part of Brazil’s national identity. I consider *marrom, moreno*, and *pardo* brown color categories. *Moreno claro* translates as light brown. The English translation of *moreno escuro* and *moreno jambo*

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF AFRO-BRAZILIAN RESPONDENTS SELF-IDENTIFIED IN CENSUS AND OPEN COLOR CATEGORIES; AND RESPONDENTS CLASSIFIED IN CENSUS COLOR CATEGORIES BY INTERVIEWERS

| <i>Salvador</i> | | | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|--|-----|-------------------------|-----|
| CENSUS CATEGORY | OPEN-ENDED COLOR CATEGORY | INTERVIEWER CLASSIFIED CENSUS COLOR CATEGORY | | | |
| White (<i>branco</i>) | 12 | White (<i>branco</i>) | 8 | White (<i>branco</i>) | 2 |
| Black (<i>preto</i>) | 208 | Black (<i>negro, negão,* preto</i>) | 210 | Black (<i>preto</i>) | 230 |
| Brown (<i>pardo</i>) | 104 | Brown (<i>mulato, moreno, pardo, moreno claro, marrom</i>) | 121 | Brown (<i>pardo</i>) | 102 |
| Other | 6 | Other | | Other | 0 |
| <i>São Paulo</i> | | | | | |
| CENSUS CATEGORY | OPEN-ENDED COLOR CATEGORY | INTERVIEWER CLASSIFIED CENSUS COLOR CATEGORY | | | |
| White (<i>branco</i>) | 21 | White (<i>branco</i>) | 20 | White (<i>branco</i>) | 4 |
| Black (<i>preto</i>) | 141 | Black (<i>negro, negão,* preto</i>) | 150 | Black (<i>preto</i>) | 191 |
| Brown (<i>pardo</i>) | 131 | Brown (<i>mulato, moreno, pardo, moreno claro, moreno escuro, moreno jambo marrom</i>) | 143 | Brown (<i>pardo</i>) | 119 |
| Other | 0 | Other | 3 | Other | 3 |

*Negão literally means big black or really black. In Brazilian Portuguese, one can emphasize that an object or person is large by adding *ão* to the word: thus *negro* becomes *negão*.

is dark brown. *Mulato* is mixed-race. Table 1 gives the results in absolute numbers of respondents identifying in the open-ended and close-ended questions and how they were classified by the interviewer. I focus on respondents' self-identification in the open-ended question.

Overall, the color and racial category most claimed was black (*preto* and *negro*). Considering the open-ended color categories, the Afro-Brazilian sample in Salvador is made up of 2 percent of Afro-Brazilians who identified as white, 62 percent who

TABLE 2. MONTHLY FAMILY INCOME IN SALVADOR AND SÃO PAULO (%)

| | SALVADOR | SÃO PAULO |
|--|------------|------------|
| No income | 3 | 3 |
| < 2 times the minimum salary* (R\$700) | 40 | 26 |
| 2 to 5 times the minimum salary (R\$700–1,750) | 44 | 46 |
| 5 to 10 times the minimum salary (R\$1,750–3,000) | 12 | 22 |
| 10 to 20 times the minimum salary (R\$3,500–7,000) | 1 | 3 |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>100</i> | <i>100</i> |

*The minimum monthly salary is R\$350. Rather than an hour minimum wage, in Brazil one considers minimum monthly salary.

identified as black (*preto, negro, negão*), and 36 percent who claimed some type of brown (*mulato, moreno, pardo, moreno claro, marrom*) identification. Considering the open-ended color categories in São Paulo, 6 percent of Afro-Brazilians self-identified as white (*branco*), 47 percent identified as black (*preto, negro, negão*), 45 percent identified as brown (*mulato, moreno, pardo, moreno claro, moreno escuro, moreno jambo, and marrom*), and 2 percent identified as “other.” In both cities, the number of blacks (*pretos*) interviewers classified as such exceeds the number of self-identified blacks (*pretos* and *negros*). Afro-Brazilians identifying as brown have fundamentally different political behavior than those who identify as black (G. Mitchell 2009). This leads to my conclusion that Afro-Brazilians identifying as black may be more likely to support affirmative-action policy than those who self-identify in nonblack categories. I note these are the categories respondents chose for the survey and in everyday life; color categories can change by the minute depending on a person’s social situation.

Gender, Education, Income, and Age

In Salvador, 52 percent of respondents were male and 48 percent female. In São Paulo, 57 percent were female and 43 percent were male. In both cities, the average age was 33. In Salvador, respondents ages ranged from 17 to 67, and in São Paulo, from 16 to 83.

Educationally, 45 percent of the sample in Salvador and 36 percent of the sample in São Paulo had some high school education or had finished high school. In Salvador, 15 percent did not complete middle school, and in São Paulo, 24 percent did not. There were 19 percent of respondents in Salvador and 14 percent in São Paulo who were pre-college. In Salvador, 40 percent of respondents had a monthly family income of two

minimum salaries or R\$700 (approximately \$350 USD).² I consider this low-income. About 44 percent of the sample had an average family income of R\$700 to R\$1,750 (\$350 to \$875 USD) per month. Only 13 percent of the sample had a high monthly family income, ranging from R\$1,750 to R\$7,000 (\$1,875 to \$3,500 USD) (see table 2). In São Paulo, 26 percent of respondents had a monthly family income of approximately R\$700 (approximately \$350 USD), 46 percent had a monthly family income between R\$700 and R\$1,750 (\$350 and \$875 USD), and 25 percent had a monthly family income between R\$1,750 and R\$7,000 (\$875 and \$3,500 USD). Although the sample in São Paulo was less educated than the Salvador sample, they earned more money—likely due to it being a more developed city. Now that I have examined descriptive statistics of relevant variables of the data, I turn to my analysis.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS

Hypothesis and Variables

My hypothesis is that Afro-Brazilians who believe blacks (*negros*) face difficulties in society due to racism and discrimination, claim a black identification, and are highly educated are more likely to support affirmative-action policy than those who believe blacks' problems are due to social or class inequality, claim nonblack identifications, and are less educated. As stated earlier, previous research shows that Afro-Brazilians who identify as black are more likely to vote for black candidates. For this reason, it is likely that blacks would support racial policies for blacks. Presumably, Afro-Brazilians with higher incomes do not face class discrimination; thus it is plausible that when facing discrimination, they will attribute this to racial discrimination rather than class discrimination. Angela Figueredo's (2010) work on middle-class Afro-Brazilians in Salvador show that they face racial discrimination but do not confront the perpetrators, because they simply believe these people have bad manners, and they do not want to cause problems for people less well off than themselves. Nonetheless, Figueredo's work is illustrative of the fact that middle-class Afro-Brazilians face racial discrimination. It is likely that Afro-Brazilians with lower incomes will attribute discrimination to their class rather than race. Gladys Mitchell (2010b) finds that Afro-Brazilians who self-identify as *negro* and *preto* are more likely to claim they have experienced racism than those claiming nonblack identities. For this reason, it is possible that self-identifying as black will positively correlate with support of affirmative-action policies.

The alternative hypothesis is that Afro-Brazilians with higher levels of education are not more likely to support affirmative-action policies than those with lower levels of education. As noted earlier, Telles and Bailey (2002) find that among all color groups, support for affirmative action decreases as education increases. It is noteworthy that the survey they use was restricted to the state of Rio de Janeiro and was conducted in the year 2000, before the implementation of affirmative-action policies in universities.

To test my hypotheses, I use a logistic regression model. The dependent variable is support for affirmative action in employment and university admissions, and the independent variables are racial/color identification, gender, age, income, education, city, and opinion of the major problem of blacks (*negros*). The survey question regarding affirmative action states: "Affirmative action is a program that focuses on the problem of discrimination against blacks (*negros*) and browns (*pardos*). It encourages universities and workplaces to have a higher percentage of blacks and browns. Do you believe affirmative action programs are important?"³ Respondents could answer yes or no. In the sample, 70 percent of respondents support affirmative action and 30 percent do not. Thus an overwhelming percentage of Afro-Brazilians in the Salvador and São Paulo samples support affirmative action.

Respondent ages were grouped in the following cohorts: 16–25; 26–40; 41–55; and 56 years and older. The variable city is a dichotomous variable and includes Salvador and São Paulo. The color/racial identification variable is how the respondent self-identifies in an open-ended question asking about their color or race. The categories are: white (*branco*), light brown (*moreno claro*), mixed-race (*mulato*), brown (*moreno, pardo, marrom*), dark brown (*moreno jambo*), the racial category black (*negro*), and the color category black (*preto*). The education categories are: did not complete middle school, completed middle school, some high school or completed high school, pre-college, in college or completed college, and graduate level education. The monthly family income categories are: zero; up to two minimum salaries or \$350 USD; between two and five minimum salaries or between \$350 and \$875 USD; between five and ten minimum salaries or between \$875 and \$1,750 USD; and between ten and twenty minimum salaries or between \$1,750 and \$3,500 USD.

The independent variable, "major problem of blacks," is operationalized with the question "What do you think is the major problem of blacks (*negros*)?" I grouped these responses into eight categories. Those categories are (1) racism/discrimination/prejudice/exclusion; (2) lack of opportunity/lack of opportunity to study; (3) racism or discrimination from blacks themselves/blacks do not vote for blacks; (4) lack of education, lack of money/low education/poverty/hunger/lack of places to live/not prepared;

(5) before they did not have space, now they do; (6) social inequality; (7) lack of unity, lack of knowledge about black people, lack of consciousness; and (8) blacks are not interested/accustomed to their situation/blacks do not like to study/lack of courage. These responses are quite telling, as some respondents blame blacks (*negros*) for their situation, while others blame racism or social inequality for the obstacles blacks face. Because of the open-ended format, answers are useful for examining if a respondent is sympathetic with blacks. Empathy can be demonstrated by acknowledging structural obstacles blacks face, rather than blaming victims of discrimination, or attributing difficulties blacks face to social inequalities.

Noteworthy is that most (50 percent) of the self-identified white Afro-Brazilian respondents cited a lack of education, lack of money, or poverty as the major problem of blacks. Most blacks and browns cited racism or discrimination as the major problem of blacks. About 36 percent of browns cited racism as the major problem of blacks, while 40 percent of *negros* cited racism. Roughly 43 percent of *pretos* cited discrimination as the major problem of blacks. Afro-Brazilians self-identifying as white were more likely to attribute black problems to class inequality, whereas most black and brown respondents discussed blacks' problems as racialized problems of racism and discrimination.

PRETOS VERSUS NEGROS, AND THE MAJOR PROBLEM
OF BLACKS (*NEGROS*)

John Burdick (1998) noted that *pretos* as compared with *negros assumidos*, or Afro-descendants who later in life identified as black, more often recalled personal experiences of racial discrimination. Slightly more *pretos* cite racism and discrimination as a major problem of blacks. About 43 percent of *pretos* cite discrimination and racism, and 40 percent of *negros* cite racism and discrimination as the major problem of blacks (see table 3). Some 32 percent of *pretos* cite either a lack of education or money, or poverty as the major problem of blacks, while 28 percent of *negros* cite these same problems. Thus there are slight differences between *pretos* and *negros* in explaining the difficulties blacks (*negros*) face, but they are not overwhelming differences. It is noteworthy that 1 percent of *negros* claimed that the major problem of blacks is social inequality, and no *pretos* cited social inequality. It is also noteworthy that 5 percent of *negros* claimed that the major problem of blacks is racism from blacks, while only 1 percent of *pretos* claimed this.

TABLE 3. “MAJOR PROBLEM OF BLACKS” CITED BY SELF-IDENTIFIED *NEGRO* AND *PRETO* RESPONDENTS IN SALVADOR AND SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL.

| MAJOR PROBLEM OF BLACKS | NEGRO | PRETO |
|---|--------------|--------------|
| Racism/discrimination/prejudice/exclusion | 40 | 43 |
| Lack of unity, lack of knowledge about black people, lack of consciousness | 5 | 7 |
| Social inequality | 1 | 0 |
| Before they did not have space, now they do | 7 | 7 |
| Lack of education, lack of money/low education/poverty/hunger/ lack of place to live | 28 | 32 |
| Racism or discrimination from blacks themselves/blacks don't vote for blacks | 5 | 1 |
| Lack of opportunity/lack of opportunity to study | 11 | 6 |
| Blacks aren't interested/accustomed to their situation/blacks don't like to study; lack of courage | 3 | 3 |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>100%</i> | <i>100%*</i> |

*Rounding affected the tally in this column.

LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS

I have discussed general trends of the independent variables. I now turn to my analysis. In the logistic regression model, support for affirmative action is the dependent variable, and the independent variables are age, city, gender, education, income, and the “major problem of blacks.” In the logistic regression analysis, where support for affirmative action is the dependent variable, age, city, and opinion of the major problem of blacks are all statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence interval (see table 4). Income is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence interval. As age increases, the likelihood a respondent will support affirmative action decreases. Afro-Brazilians in the age cohort of 16–25 years old are 78 percent likely to support affirmative action, holding the independent variables income, gender, city, education, color identification, and major problem of blacks constant (see table 5). Those in the age cohort of 26–40 years old are 73 percent likely to support affirmative action, holding income, gender, city, education, color identification, and major problem of blacks constant. This likelihood decreases to only 58 percent for those 56 years or older. Thus a respondent in the youngest cohort is 1.3 times more likely to support affirmative action than a respondent in the oldest cohort, holding income, gender, city,

TABLE 4. LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (N 613)

| INDEPENDENT VARIABLE | COEFFICIENT | STANDARD ERROR |
|----------------------|-------------|----------------|
| Age | -0.97 | 0.31 |
| Gender | -0.20 | 0.18 |
| City | -0.52 | 0.19 |
| Color | 0.22 | 0.38 |
| Education | -0.32 | 0.45 |
| Income | 1.21 | 0.50 |
| Black problems | 0.74 | 0.28 |
| Constant | 0.60 | 0.42 |

education, color identification, and major problem of blacks constant. It is likely that younger cohorts support affirmative action more than older cohorts because of their accommodation to the discourse of racism and the need for redress through racial policies. As noted earlier, the discourse of race in Brazil has significantly changed from denying racism to acknowledging racism in Brazilian society, and younger cohorts have been more exposed to the rhetoric of acknowledging racism than older cohorts.

Respondents in São Paulo are more likely to support affirmative action than respondents in Salvador. Holding the independent variables education, income, gender, age, color identification, and major problem of blacks constant, respondents in São Paulo are 77 percent likely to support affirmative action, as compared to those in Salvador, who are only 67 percent likely to support the policy. I believe Afro-Brazilians in Salvador are less willing to support affirmative-action policies than respondents in São Paulo because the percentage of Afro-Brazilians in Salvador is more than double the percentage in São Paulo. As a result, racial dynamics in the two cities are different.

TABLE 5. PROBABILITY OF SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BY AGE COHORT (INCOME, GENDER, CITY, EDUCATION, COLOR IDENTIFICATION, AND “MAJOR PROBLEM OF BLACKS” CONSTANT)

| AGE | YES | NO |
|-------|------|------|
| 16-25 | 0.78 | 0.22 |
| 26-40 | 0.73 | 0.27 |
| 41-55 | 0.66 | 0.34 |
| 56+ | 0.58 | 0.42 |

There is a much larger white population in São Paulo. Because Salvador is overwhelmingly Afro-descendant, respondents may believe racial policies aimed at blacks (*negros*) are not needed in a city where they compose a majority of the population. In contrast, Afro-Brazilians in São Paulo are a minority, and thus may be more likely to acknowledge the need for racial policies for Afro-Brazilians. Much Black Movement activism began in São Paulo (Hanchard 1994), and São Paulo is home to South America's only university geared toward Afro-descendants. Thus activism has played a significant role in São Paulo despite the smaller percentage of Afro-descendants when compared to Salvador.

In this sample, education is not statistically significant; thus the alternative hypothesis that higher-educated respondents are more likely to oppose affirmative-action policy than lower-educated respondents is rejected. Although education is not statistically significant, income is. As income increases, the likelihood of support for affirmative action increases. Respondents who claim the major problem of blacks is discrimination are more likely to support affirmative action than respondents who believe the major problem of blacks is that they are accustomed to their situation, or that problems are due to social inequality. Thus my hypothesis is in part correct, but not entirely. Color or racial identification is not statistically significant. This is surprising, yet one explanation is that the survey question asks if respondents support affirmative action for blacks (*negros*) and browns (*pardos*). In the mainstream media and among Black Movement activists, the term *negro* is used to denote blacks and browns. Using the term *negro* includes browns, in addition to their specific mention with the term *pardo* in the survey question. Using the term *preto* or *negro* without the mention of *pardo* would likely have yielded different results. In a similar vein, Bailey (2008) finds that simply mentioning a racial policy for blacks results in an increase in respondents identifying as such. Thus the racial or color terminology in the survey question can influence survey results.

As predicted, those with higher incomes are more likely to support affirmative action than those with lower incomes. I posit that Afro-Brazilians with higher incomes are more likely to interpret challenges in the workplace or in society as challenges due to their race or color, rather than their class, because class is less of an issue. In fact these data show that of those stating the major problem of blacks is racism, 44 percent have a monthly family income between \$350 and \$850 USD, or two to five times the minimum salary. Thirteen percent of those citing racism and discrimination have a monthly family income between \$875 and \$1,750 USD, or five and ten monthly salaries. Education is not statistically significant. This finding is in contrast to Bailey and Telles's (2006) finding that education has a negative impact on support for affirmative action. This could be due to sample differences. A key difference is that

TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS CITING RACISM AND DISCRIMINATION AS A MAJOR PROBLEM OF BLACKS (*NEGROS*), BY MONTHLY FAMILY INCOME BRACKET

| INCOME | PERCENT |
|------------------------|-------------|
| No income | 4 |
| Up to \$350 USD | 38 |
| \$350 to \$875 USD | 44 |
| \$875 to \$1,750 USD | 13 |
| \$1,750 to \$3,000 USD | 2 |
| <i>Total</i> | <i>100%</i> |

my sample is restricted to Afro-Brazilians and limited to neighborhoods in Salvador and São Paulo. Telles and Bailey's data includes white, brown, and black Brazilians and is based on a state survey.

Fifty-nine percent of respondents who admit the major problem of blacks is racism and discrimination have monthly family incomes in the middle income category (\$350 to \$850 USD) and two highest income categories (see table 6). Only 4 percent of those claiming racism is the major problem of blacks come from the lowest income bracket of no earnings. However, 38 percent of those admitting racism is a major problem of blacks come from the next to lowest income bracket.

As predicted, respondents who cited racism or discrimination as a major problem of blacks, rather than blaming blacks or citing class inequality, had a higher predicted probability of supporting affirmative action (see table 7). Because many in the sample support affirmative-action policies, the predicted probabilities are high for all responses; yet there are some differences. Examples of responses that blame blacks are: racism or discrimination from blacks themselves, or blacks are not interested and are accustomed to their situation. In the first case, holding the variables age, gender, income, education, color identification, and city constant, the predicted probability of support for affirmative action for a respondent who believes the major problem of blacks is racism from blacks themselves is 0.66. Similarly the predicted probability for a respondent who claims blacks are not interested or are accustomed to their situation is 0.62. This is the lowest predicted probability of support for affirmative action of all responses. In contrast, holding the variables age, gender, income, education, color identification, and city constant, the predicted probability of support for affirmative action for a respondent who claims the major problem of blacks is racism and discrimination is 0.80. This lends credence to my hypothesis that respondents sympathetic to blacks (*negros*) by admitting the barrier of racial exclusion are more likely to support

TABLE 7. PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF SUPPORTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CONSIDERING RESPONSES TO “MAJOR PROBLEM OF BLACKS” (AGE, GENDER, INCOME, EDUCATION, COLOR IDENTIFICATION, AND CITY CONSTANT)

| MAJOR PROBLEM OF BLACKS | PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF SUPPORT OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION |
|---|---|
| Racism/discrimination/prejudice/exclusion | 0.80 |
| Lack of unity, lack of knowledge about black people, lack of consciousness | 0.75 |
| Social inequality | 0.73 |
| Before they did not have space, now they do | 0.71 |
| Lack of education, lack of money/low education/poverty/hunger/lack of places to live | 0.69 |
| Racism or discrimination from blacks themselves/blacks don't vote for blacks | 0.66 |
| Lack of opportunity/lack of opportunity to study | 0.64 |
| Blacks aren't interested/accustomed to their situation/blacks don't like to study; lack of courage | 0.62 |

affirmative-action policies than those blaming victims of discrimination for the problems they face. Similarly, the predicted probability of support for affirmative action for a respondent who claims that blacks' problems are due to social inequality is 0.73, while the predicted probability of support is only 0.69 for those who claim blacks' problems are due to poverty or a lack of education. These results are demonstrative of the role that acknowledging racism as a problem of blacks, or claiming these problems are simply class-based problems play on support for affirmative-action policies.

**AGE, CITY, INCOME, MAJOR PROBLEM OF BLACKS,
AND SUPPORT FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION**

To highlight the interaction of the independent variables age, city, income, and the major problem of blacks, which are all statistically significant in a logistic regression model where support for affirmative action is the dependent variable, I examine predicted probabilities. Holding the variables gender, color identification, and education constant, the predicted probability of supporting affirmative action for a respondent in the oldest age cohort (56 years and older) in Salvador with no income who believes the major problem of blacks is that blacks are not interested or are accustomed to their

situation is only 0.28 percent. In contrast, holding the independent variables gender, education, and color identification constant, the predicted probability of support of affirmative action by a respondent in the youngest age cohort (16–25 years old) in the city of São Paulo, in the highest income bracket that admits the major problem of blacks is racism, is 0.92. This is a difference of 0.64. Thus the respondent in Sao Paulo in the youngest age cohort, highest income bracket admitting the major problem of blacks is racism is 3.3 times more likely than a Salvador respondent in the lowest income bracket who blames blacks for their problems to support affirmative action.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter, I find that Afro-Brazilian respondents in São Paulo are more likely than respondents in Salvador to support affirmative-action policies. I also find that younger respondents are more likely to support the policy than older respondents, and that as income increases, the likelihood that a respondent will support affirmative action increases. Beyond these demographic variables, an important finding is that Afro-Brazilian respondents who cite racism and discrimination as a major problem of blacks are more likely to support affirmative action than those citing social inequality or who blame Afro-Brazilians for their problems by claiming they are accustomed to their situations.

Scholars studying political opinion and racial attitudes of Afro-Brazilians cannot assume that racial solidarity leads to overwhelming support of affirmative-action policy. Yet it is important to consider that changing racial politics in Brazil may influence Afro-Brazilians to acknowledge racism in Brazilian society. While Brazil is a multiracial society seeking redress for the ills of racism, it is important to note how potential beneficiaries of policies aimed at them interpret these programs. It is ultimately up to individual Afro-Brazilians to interpret exclusion against them in society. As Afro-Brazilians increasingly acknowledge the role of both racial and class discrimination rather than simply class discrimination, it is likely they will support and seek the implementation of such programs.

NOTES

1. The author thanks the following for their assistance in Brazil: Edson Arruda, Paula Barreto, Magda Lorena, Cloves Oliveira, Leon Padial, Rosana Paiva, Jacqueline Romio, Kledir Salgado,

Thabatha Silva, Gislene Santos, Darlene Sousa, Ricardo Summers, Jaqueline Santos, Gabriela Watson, Neusa, and Gloria Ventapane.

2. For an idea of the class standing of respondents, I report average monthly family incomes for various occupations. My statistical analyses concern monthly family income, which combines all incomes of those working in the household. A maid has a monthly family income of 386 *reais*, a bus driver of 964 *reais*, an engineer of 5,246 *reais*, and a construction worker 637 *reais* (www.worldsalaries.org/brazil.shtml).
3. Ação afirmativa é um programa que enfoca o problema da discriminação contra negros e pardos. Ela tenta incentivar que nas universidades e no trabalho tenha uma porcentagem maior de negros e pardos. Você acredita que programas de ação afirmativa são importantes?

R E F E R E N C E S

- Bailey, Stanley R. 2008. "Unmixing for Race Making in Brazil." *American Journal of Sociology* 114(3):577–614.
- . 2009. *Legacies of Race: Identities, Attitudes, and Politics in Brazil*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Bailey, Stanley R. and Edward E. Telles. 2006. "Multiracial vs. Collective Black Categories: Census Classification Debates in Brazil." *Ethnicities* 6(1): 74–101.
- Brubaker, Rogers, and Frederick Cooper. 2000. "Beyond 'Identity.'" *Theory and Society* 29.
- Burdick, John. 1998. "The Lost Constituency of Brazil's Black Movements." *Latin American Perspectives* 25:136–155.
- Castro, Mônica. 1993. "Raça e comportamento político." *Dados* 36:469–491.
- Covin, David. 2006. *Unified Black Movement in Brazil, 1978–2002*. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company.
- Fernandes, Florestan. 1965. *A integração do negro na sociedade de classes*. São Paulo: Dominus Editora.
- Figueredo, Angela. 2010. "Out of Place: The Experience of the Black Middle Class." In *Brazil's New Racial Politics*, ed. Bernd Reiter and Gladys Mitchell. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Francis, Andrew, and Maria Tannuri-Pinto. 2009. *Using Brazil's Racial Continuum to Examine the Short-Term Effects of Affirmative Action in Higher Education*. Unpublished manuscript.
- Fry, Peter, Yvonne Maggie, Marcos Chor Maio, Simone Monteiro, Ricardo V. Santos. 2007. *Divisões perigosas: Políticas raciais no Brasil contemporâneo*. 1st ed. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira.
- Guimarães, Antonio Sergio. 2001. "The Race Issue in Brazilian Politics (The Last Fifteen Years)." Fifteen Years of Democracy in Brazil Conference. University of London, London, England, 15–16 February.
- Hagopian, Francis. 1996. *Traditional Politics and Regime Change in Brazil*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Hanchard, Michael. 1994. *Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, 1945–1988*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hasenbalg, Carlos. 1978. "Race Relations in Post-Abolition Brazil: The Smooth Preservation of Racial Inequalities." PhD dissertation, University of California, Berkeley.

- Hooker, Juliet. 2009. *Race and the Politics of Solidarity*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Johnson III, Ollie. 1998. "Racial Representation and Brazilian Politics: Black Members of the National Congress, 1983–1999." *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 40:97–118.
- . 2006. "Locating Blacks in Brazilian Politics: Afro-Brazilian Activism, New Political Parties, and Pro-Black Public Policies." *International Journal of Africana Studies* 12: 170–193.
- Mainwaring, Scott, et al. 2000. "Conservative Parties, Democracy, and Economic Reform in Contemporary Brazil." In *Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America*, by Kevin Middlebrook, 164–222. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Mitchell, Gladys. 2009. "Black Group Identity and Vote Choice in Brazil." *Opinião Pública* 15(2).
- . 2010a. "Politicizing Blackness: Afro-Brazilian Color Identification and Candidate Preference." In *Brazil's New Racial Politics*, ed. Bernd Reiter and Gladys Mitchell. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- . 2010b. "Racism and Brazilian Democracy: Two Sides of the Same Coin?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33(10).
- Mitchell, Michael. 1977. "Racial Consciousness and the Political Attitudes and Behavior of Blacks in São Paulo, Brazil." PhD dissertation, Indiana University.
- . 2007. "Race and Democracy in Brazil: The Racial Factor in Public Opinion." Paper presented at the National Conference of Black Political Scientists, San Francisco, CA, 21–24 March.
- Mitchell, Michael, and Charles Wood. 1998. "The Ironies of Citizenship: Skin Color, Police Brutality, and the Challenges to Brazilian Democracy." *Social Forces* 77:1001–1020.
- Nobles, Melissa. 2000. *Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Oliveira, Cloves. 2007. A Inevitável Visibilidade de Cor: Estudo comparativo das campanhas de Benedita da Silva e Celso Pitta às prefeituras do Rio de Janeiro e São Paulo, nas eleições de 1992 e 1996. PhD dissertation, Instituto Universitário de Pesquisa do Rio de Janeiro (IUPERJ).
- Oliveira, Cloves Luiz P. 1997. *A Luta por um Lugar: Gênero, Raça, e Classe: Eleições Municipais de Salvador-Bahia, 1992*. Salvador: Serie Toques Programa A Cor da Bahia-UFBA.
- Paixão, Marcelo, and Luiz M. Carvano. 2008. *Relatório anual das desigualdades raciais no Brasil, 2007–2008*. Rio de Janeiro: Editoria Garamond Ltda.
- Pardue, Derek. 2004. "Putting Mano to Music: The Mediation of Race in Brazilian Rap." *Ethnomusicology Forum* 13:253–286.
- Pereira, João Baptista Borges. 1982. "Aspectos do comportamento político do negro em São Paulo." *Ciência e Cultura* 34:1286–1294.
- Prandi, Reginaldo. 1996. "Raça e boto na eleição presidencial de 1994." *Estudos Afro-Asiáticos* 30:61–78.
- Racusen, Seth. 2010. "Affirmative Action and Identity." In *Brazil's New Racial Politics*, by Bernd Reiter and Gladys Mitchell. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Reiter, Bernd, and Gladys Mitchell, eds. *Brazil's New Racial Politics*. 2010. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Sansone, Livio. 2004. *Negritude sem Etnicidade: O Local e o Global Nas Relações Raciais e na Produção Cultural Negra do Brasil*. Salvador, BA: EDUFBA.
- Santos, Gislene A. 2008. "Racism and Its Masks in Brazil: On Racism and the Idea of Harmony."

Gladys Mitchell-Walthour

- In *Race, Colonialism, and Social Transformation in Latin America and Caribbean*, ed. Jerome Branch, 91–115. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Santos, Sales Augusto dos. 2000. *A ausência de uma bancada suprapartidária afro-brasileira no Congresso Nacional (Legislatura 1995/1998)*. 2 vols. Brasília: Centro de Estudos Afro-Asiáticos.
- . 2006. “Who is Black in Brazil? A Timely or a False Question in Brazilian Race Relations in the Era of Affirmative Action?” *Latin American Perspectives* 33:30–48.
- . 2010. “Black NGOs and ‘Conscious’ Rap: New Agents of the Antiracism Struggle in Brazil.” In *Brazil’s New Racial Politics*, ed. Bernd Reiter and Gladys Mitchell. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Sheriff, Robin. 2001. *Dreaming Equality: Color, Race, and Racism in Urban Brazil*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Soares, Glaucio, Ary Dillon, and Nelson da Valle Silva. 1987. “Urbanization, Race, and Class in Brazilian Politics.” *Latin American Research Review* 22:155–176.
- Souza, Amaury de. 1971. “Raça e política no Brasil urbano.” *Revista de Administração de Empresas* 11:61–70.
- Telles, Edward. 2004. *Race in Another America: The Significance of Skin Color in Brazil*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Twine, France Winddance. 1998. *Racism in a Racial Democracy: The Maintenance of White Supremacy*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- Valente, Ana Lúcia E. F. 1986. *Política e relações raciais: Os negros e às eleições paulistas de 1982*. São Paulo: FFLCH-US.
- Von Mettenheim, Kurt. 1986. *The Brazilian Voter: Mass Politics in Democratic Transition, 1974–1986*. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.